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Performance Measurement Methodology
and the Question of Whether Stocks Overreact
ABSTRACT
One of the most controversial issues in financial economics is the
question of whether stocks overreact. Using portfolios formed on the
basis of prior 5-year returns, we find that there is an economically
important overreaction effect. Depending upon the exact procedure
employed, extreme prior losers subsequently outperform extreme prior
winners by 5-10 percent per year during the subsequent 5 years. This
overreaction effect is substantially stronger for smaller firms than for
larger firms. It is unlikely that the overreaction effect can be
attributed to risk mismeasurement , since returns consistent with the
overreaction hypothesis are also observed for short windows around
quarterly earnings announcements
.

1. Introduction
The predictability of stock returns has arguably been the most
controversial financial research topic of recent years. Various
researchers have documented predictable returns over long and short
horizons for both individual securities and indices. 1 While there is now
a consensus that returns are predictable, there is widespread disagreement
about the underlying reasons for this predictability. As stated by Fama
(1991) , the interpretation of the return predictability evidence runs
"head-on into the joint-hypothesis problem; that is, does return
predictability reflect rational variation through time in expected returns,
irrational deviations of price from fundamental value, or some combination
of the two?" One of the most influential, and most controversial, papers
in this line of research is De Bondt and Thaler (1985), in which evidence
of economically important return reversals over long intervals is
presented. In particular, stocks that experience poor performance over the
past 3 to 5 years (losers) tend to substantially outperform prior-period
winners over the subsequent 3 to 5 years. De Bondt and Thaler interpret
their evidence as a manifestation of irrational behavior by investors,
which they term "overreaction.
"
Various authors (Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989)), however, have
argued that these return reversals are primarily a manifestation of
systematic changes in equilibrium required returns that were not captured
by De Bondt and Thaler. One of the main arguments for why required returns
1 Among the many recent studies documenting time-series return
predictability for long and short horizons are Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein
(1985), Fama and French (1988), Poterba and Summers (1988), Conrad and Kaul
(1989), Jagadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990).
2on extreme winners and losers vary substantially follows from pronounced
changes in leverage. Since the equity beta of a firm is a function of both
the firm's asset risk and its leverage, a series of negative abnormal
returns will increase the equity beta of a firm, increasing the expected
return on the stock. 2 Following the same logic, a decrease in the equity
beta is expected for winners. Consistent with the prediction of the
leverage hypothesis, Ball and Kothari report that the betas of extreme
losers exceed the betas of extreme winners by a full 0.76 following the
portfolio formation period. Such a large difference in betas, coupled with
historical risk premiums, can account for substantial differences in
realized returns.
Another reason that has been advanced for why losers outperform
winners relates to the size effect. Zarowin (1990) and others have argued
that the superior performance of losers relative to winners is not due to
investor overreaction, but instead is a manifestation of the size effect,
in that losers tend to be smaller-sized firms than winners.
In general, attempts to discriminate between market inefficiency and
changing equilibrium required returns are most difficult when long return
intervals are used. This is because the measurement of abnormal
performance over long horizons is very sensitive to the performance
benchmark used, as emphasized by Dimson and Marsh (1986). In this paper,
in addition to allowing time-variation in betas as recently applied in this
context by Ball and Kothari (1989), we introduce three methodological
innovations that enable us to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the
2This assumes that the asset beta is positive and that the firm does not
change its debt to fully offset the decline in the value of its equity.
3overreaction hypothesis. This methodology is applicable to any study
measuring abnormal performance over long horizons.
First, we use the empirically-determined price of beta risk, rather
than that assumed by a specific highly- structured model such as the Sharpe-
Lintner CAPM. As Ball and Kothari document, the betas of extreme
prior-period winners and losers differ dramatically. Consequently, large
differences in returns between winners and losers can be accounted for by
the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, in which the compensation per unit of beta risk is
rm -r f , where rm is the return on the market and r f is the risk- free rate.
In the 1931-82 period, rm -r f averages almost 15 percent per year using an
equally-weighted index of NYSE stocks for rm and Treasury bills for rf .
The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM assumption is innocuous in many other studies,
where the portfolio betas typically do not differ much from 1.0. But in
this study, the betas of winners are markedly different from the betas of
losers. Numerous empirical studies, starting with Black, Jensen, and
Scholes (1972), find a much flatter slope than that assumed by the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. 3 By using empirical estimates of the market
compensation per unit of beta risk, our methodology avoids the model
misspecification that occurs when rm -r f is assumed to be the market price
per unit of beta risk.
Second, numerous studies have found a relation between size and
future returns. Portfolios of losers are typically comprised of smaller
stocks than portfolios of winners. Thus, in order to ascertain whether
3 Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Tinic and
West (1984), Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1989),
Ritter and Chopra (1989), and Kan (1991), among others, find flatter slopes
than predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.
4there is an independent overreaction effect, a size adjustment is
appropriate. However, because small- firm portfolios are intensive in
losers, the common procedure of adjusting for size might overadjust and
thus create a bias against finding an independent overreaction effect. To
address this possibility, we purge our size-control portfolios of stocks
with extreme performance
.
A This methodology enables us to disentangle the
effects of size and prior performance in calculating abnormal returns on
winner and loser portfolios. In addition, we explore the generality of the
effect in both January and non- January months.
Third, abnormal returns calculated over long intervals are inherently
sensitive to the benchmark used. Currently, there is no consensus on what
is the "best" benchmark to use. Because of this problem, research
documenting abnormal returns calculated over long intervals is frequently
treated with suspicion. Therefore, in one of our tests, we minimize this
problem by focusing on short windows in which a relatively large amount of
new information is disseminated. This approach is analogous to that
employed by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1991) in their investigation of
abnormal returns following earnings announcements. In the three-day period
in which quarterly earnings announcements occur, we compute abnormal
returns for winners and losers. In our context, positive abnormal returns
at subsequent earnings announcements for prior losers, and negative
abnormal returns for prior winners, are consistent with the overreaction
A Fama and French (1986) use a nearly identical procedure for controlling
for size effects. For size deciles, they compare the average return on prior
winners and losers with stocks in the same size decile that were in the
middle 50 percent of returns during Che portfolio formation period. They use
3-year periods rather than 5-year periods, but find qualitatively similiar
results to those reported here.
5hypothesis. In drawing our inferences, we are careful in adjusting for
size effects and the higher volatility that other researchers (e.g., Chari,
Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988)) have documented at earnings announcement
dates.
Our results indicate that there is an economically significant
overreaction effect present in the stock market. Moreover, it is very
unlikely that this effect can be attributed to measurement problems since
returns consistent with the overreaction hypothesis are also observed for
short windows around quarterly earnings announcements. Depending upon the
exact procedure employed, extreme losers outperform extreme winners by 5 to
9 percent per year in the years following the portfolio formation period.
Although disproportionately concentrated in January, there is evidence that
this overreaction effect is present in other months as well. The
overreaction effect, however, is not uniform across all size groups.
Instead, it is much stronger among smaller firms, which are predominantly
held by individuals. Indeed, there is at most only weak evidence of an
overreaction effect among the largest firms, which are predominantly held
by institutions. One interpretation of our findings might be that
individuals overreact, but institutions don't.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In
Section 2, we measure the extent of abnormal performance for portfolios
formed on the basis of prior returns while controlling for, alternately,
beta and size effects. In Section 3, we present evidence on the abnormal
returns for winners and losers while simultaneously controlling for beta
and size effects. We also explore seasonal and cross-sectional patterns in
the extent of overreaction. In Section 4, we present evidence from the
market's reaction to earnings announcements. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 . Beta and Size-adjusted Excess Returns
A. Methodology
For comparability with prior studies (e.g., Ball and Kothari (1989))
we use the CRSP monthly tape of New York Stock Exchange issues from 1926 to
1986. All stocks that are continuously listed for the prior 5 calendar
years are ranked each year on the basis of their 5-year returns and
assigned to one of twenty (vitile) portfolios. Thus, the first ranking
period ends in December 1930, and the last one ends in December 1981, a
total of 52 ranking periods. The post-ranking periods are overlapping 5-
year intervals starting with 1931-35 and ending with 1982-86. For each of
the vitile portfolios, this procedure results in a time series of 52
portfolio returns for each of the 10 event years -4 to +5, with the last
year of the ranking period designated as year 0. These 52 observations are
used to estimate betas and abnormal returns for the 10 event years.
Annual portfolio returns for each firm are constructed from the
monthly CRSP returns by compounding the monthly returns in a calendar year
to create an annual buy and hold return. The annual returns of the firms
assigned to a portfolio are then averaged to get the portfolio's annual
return. 5
To estimate the market model coefficients, we use Ibbotson's (1975)
Returns Across Time and Securities (RATS) procedure. For each event year
5 If a firm is delisted within a calendar year, its annual return for
that year is calculated by using the CRSP equally-weighted index return for
the remainder of that year. In subsequent years, the firm is deleted from
the portfolio.
r- -4, ... 0, +1, . . .+5 and vitile portfolio p, we run the following
regression using 52 observations:
rpt(0-r ft = av (r) + £p (r ) [rmt -r ft ] + ept (r) (1)
where rpt (r) is the annual return on portfolio p in calendar year t and
event year r, rmt is the equally-weighted market return on NYSE stocks
meeting our sample selection criteria in calendar year t, and r ft is the
annual return on T-bills (from Ibbotson Associates (1988)). The intercept
in equation (1) is known as Jensen's (1969) alpha, and is a measure of
abnormal performance.
B. Beta-adjusted excess returns
In columns (l)-(3) of Table 1, we have formed portfolios on the basis
of ranking firms by their prior 5-year returns. We report the annual
returns, alphas, and betas averaged over the five years following the
portfolio formation (ranking) period. Our numbers are slightly different
from those reported in Ball and Kothari's Table 1 because of the different
sample selection criteria employed. Ball and Kothari require that their
firms remain listed on the NYSE for the entire 5-year post-ranking period,
whereas we do not impose such a requirement. 6
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The most striking result in Table 1 is the inverse relation between
the past and subsequent returns. Portfolio 1 (the prior-period losers) has
a post-ranking period average annual return of 27.3 percent, while
6Ball and Kothari's sample selection criteria imposes a survivorship
bias. In our sample, approximately 22 percent of the extreme loser vitile
firms are delisted by the end of the post-ranking period, and approximately
8 percent of the extreme winner vitile firms are delisted. In the 1930s,
many of the delistings occurred due to bankruptcies, whereas by the 1970s,
takeovers are the main reason for delistings. As might be expected,
bankruptcies are very rare among the extreme winners.
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8portfolio 20 (the prior-period winners) has an average post-ranking period
average annual return of 13.3 percent, a difference of 14.0 percent per
year. 7 Over the five-year post-ranking period, even before compounding,
this difference cumulates to 70 percent! The debate revolves around how
much of this difference is attributable to risk differences. In fact, as
demonstrated by Ball and Kothari, much of this difference can be explained
by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. According to column (3) of Table 1, the
difference in post-ranking betas between the extreme winner and loser
portfolios is 0.79. Given a market risk premium (rm -r f ) in the 14-15
percent range using an equally-weighted portfolio of NYSE stocks, the CAPM
predicts a difference in returns of approximately 11 percent, leaving only
3 or 4 percent of the 14.0 percent difference unaccounted for. Indeed,
using this approach, Ball and Kothari report a difference in alphas between
extreme winner and loser portfolios of 3.9 percent, which they view as
economically insignificant. 8 Using our sample, we find a difference in
alphas between extreme portfolios of 2.5 percent per year.
The conclusion that most of the difference in post-ranking returns
7 De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find a smaller difference in post-ranking
period returns between winners and losers than we (and Ball and Kothari) do.
In their Figure 3, they find a difference of about 8 percent per year for
their 5 year post-ranking period, compared to our 14 percent per year. There
are a number of reasons for this difference having to do with the sample
construction, most notably because the definition of extreme winners and
losers is not the same. In most of their work, De Bondt and Thaler define
their portfolios as the most extreme 35 firms in each year, whereas we define
our portfolios in terms of the most extreme vitiles. The number of firms in
each of our vitile portfolios increases from about 20 in the 1930s to about
50 in the 1970s, averaging about 43 firms. A further difference is that our
last ranking period ends in 1981, whereas their last ranking period ends in
1978.
One can quibble about whether abnormal returns of 3.9 percent per year
for 5 years is economically significant or not.
9between winners and losers can be accounted for as compensation for risk-
bearing is heavily dependent upon the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM's assumption that
the return per unit of beta risk provided by the market is rm -r f .
Empirical studies have invariably found a much flatter slope. Using the
same sample and the same methodology as used in columns (l)-(3), we form
portfolios on the basis of ranking-period betas. 9
In columns (6)
-(8), we report the average annual returns and the
average alphas and betas computed using the RATS methodology for the 5
post-ranking years for portfolios formed on the basis of ranking-period
betas. The dispersion in betas between the extreme portfolios reported in
column (8) is 0.86, slightly greater than the 0.79 reported in column (3).
This large difference in betas in column (8), however, is associated with a
difference in returns between extreme portfolios of only 7.3 percent,
dramatically less than the 14.0 percent reported when portfolios are formed
on the basis of ranked prior returns. It should be noted that the only
difference between columns (l)-(3) and (6) -(8) is in how the portfolios
were formed: the universe of firms and the estimation methodology are
identical.
Using the 20 portfolio returns and betas reported in columns (6) and
(8), respectively, we estimate the market compensation per unit of beta
risk. The resulting regression coefficents are an intercept of 8.6 percent
and a slope of 9.4 percent. These coefficents are consistent with those
9 The ranking-period beta of each firm was calculated on the basis of a
60 observation regression using monthly returns during the ranking period.
For each of the 52 ranking periods, firms were then ranked on the basis of
these betas, and assigned to vitile portfolios. The post-ranking period
portfolio betas were then estimated using the RATS procedure during each of
the 5 post-ranking years with annual returns.
10
reported by other researchers and mentioned in footnote 3. Note that the
8.6 percent intercept is considerably higher than the average risk-free
rate during the sample period of about 3.5 percent, and the slope
coefficent of 9.4 percent is considerably lower than the 14-15 percent
market risk premium. In other words, differences in betas do not generate
differences in returns during the sample period as great as assumed by the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.
[Insert Figures la and lb about here]
In Figures la and lb, we have plotted the regression equation
estimated from the 20 portfolios formed on the basis of prior betas. The
two extreme winner and loser portfolios are also plotted. In Figure la, we
use annual data from columns (6) and (8) of Table 1. In Figure lb, we use
monthly data (not reported in Table 1). Using annual data, the extreme
winner portfolio underperforms a portfolio with the same beta by 3.4
percent, while the extreme loser portfolio outperforms a portfolio with the
same beta by 3 . 1 percent. Thus, the difference in abnormal returns is 6.5
percent, substantially higher than the 2.5 percent reported in column (2).
The difference between these two numbers is attributable to different
assumptions about the slope of the SML. Using a misspecified benchmark
(too steep a slope) results in underestimating the overreaction effect
because the abnormal return is computed as the deviation from the SML.
To examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of a market
index, columns 4 and 5 present results for annual measurement intervals
using a value-weighted market index. The betas are all above 1.0,
reflecting the fact that the equally-weighted index itself has a beta of
1.3 with respect to the value-weighted index. The difference in alphas
c
3
2
CD
D)
3
c
0)
o
q5
a
To
c
c
as
a>
2
>
<
Loser X
+ 3.1
o-r
Beta
Fig. la. Plot of the empirical Security Market Line calculated using
annual data from the realized post-ranking period returns and betas for
vitile portfolios formed on the basis of ranking-period betas, and the
realized post-ranking period return on extreme winner and loser
portfolios.
The empirical SML is estimated from the 20 vitile returns and betas
reported in columns (6) and (ff) of Table 1. The empirical SML has an
intercept of 8.6 percent and a slope of 9.4 percent. Alphas are
calculates as deviations from the empirical SML.
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Fig. lb. Similiar to Figure la, except that monthly returns are usedwhich are then annualized by multiplying by 12 before plotting.
The empirical SML has an intercept of 8.2 percent and a slope of 9 3percent. Alphas are calculated as deviations from the empirical SML Themean annualized return is 17.5 percent rather than the 18.0 percent inFigure la due to our procedure of multiplying the average monthly returnsby 11, rather than compounding them.
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between the extreme winners and losers widens from the 2.5 percent reported
using an equally-weighted market index to 4.7 percent using a value-
weighted index.
The discussion so far has focused on annual measurement intervals,
even though monthly measurement intervals are much more commonly used in
financial research. To examine the sensitivity of the results to the use
of different measurement intervals, in columns (9) -(11) of Table 1 we
report monthly returns, alphas, and betas using an equally-weighted index.
This procedure produces a slightly smaller spread in betas (0.71 vs 0.79
when annual measurement intervals are used) , and a greater difference in
abnormal returns (0.50 percent per month, or 6.0 percent per year) between
extreme winner and loser portfolios. Using the empirical Security Market
Line calculated from monthly data with portfolios formed on the basis of
ranked prior betas, extreme losers outperform extreme winners by 9 .
5
percent per year. With a value-weighted index using monthly data, the
difference in alphas between extreme losers and winners is 12 percent per
year using the Sharpe-Lintner model as the benchmark. (These results are
not reported here.) Using the empirical Security Market Line, the
difference would be even larger.
C. Asymmetries in beta changes
The RATS procedure is ideally suited for estimating event time-
varying betas in a situation where the sample firms are experiencing
dramatic changes in their market capitalization over relatively short
intervals. In the context of this study, substantial differences in betas
Table 2
RATS betas on winner and loser portfolios for each event year from -6 to
+5 for ranking periods in all markets, down markets (rmt -rft < 0), and up
markets (r,„t -r ft > 0). Years -6 to -5 are the pre-ranking period, years
-4 to are the ranking period, and years +1 to +5 are the post-ranking
period. 3
rpt " rft " <*p + p (rmt -r ft ) + ept
Beta coefficient estimates
Year relative Years when Years ; when
to ranking All 52 vears rm -r f < only rm" r f > only
year Winners Losers Winners Losers Winners Losers
-6 1.15 1.19 1.20 1.03 1.01 1.10
-5 1.21 1.12 1.12 1.07 1.17 1.06
-4 1.58 0.78 1.11 0.96 2.02 0.52
-3 1.52 0.83 0.99 0.87 1.86 0.58
-2 1.47 0.95 0.99 0.75 1.78 0.83
-1 1.48 1.02 0.98 0.86 1.72 0.99
1.21 1.06 0.94 0.83 1.13 1.03
+1 0.85 1.54 0.94 0.97 0.63 1.73
+2 0.79 1.63 0.93 1.26 0.56 1.89
+3 0.86 1.54 0.80 1.22 0.74 1.71
+4 0.94 1.55 0.72 1.08 0.95 1.78
+5 0.88 1.61 0.77 0.95 0.88 1.88
Average
,
-6 to -5 1.18 1.15 1.16 1.05 1.09 1.08
Average
-4 to 1.45 0.93 1.00 0.85 1.70 0.79
Average
+1 to +5 0.86 1.57 0.83 1.10 0.75 1.80
a Winner and loser portfolios consist of the stocks with the most extreme total
returns over the five years -4 to 0. The 50 best and the 50 worst stocks in each
ranking are assigned to the winner and loser portfolios. In the first 2 columns,
a
p
and /3p coefficients are estimated using a time series of 52 annual portfolio
returns, using Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology. For years -6 and -5,
respectively, 50 and 51 annual returns are used because of the lack of CRSP data
for 1924 and 1925. There are between 15 and 21 down market years, and 31 to 37
up market years, for the years -6 to +5. Riskless annual returns are from
Ibbotson Associates (1988). The market return is defined to be the
equally-weighted market return on NYSE stocks meeting the sample criteria of at
least 5 years of returns.
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between winners and losers are observed using this procedure. 10 One of
the attractive features of the RATS procedure is that one can observe on a
period-by-period basis how the betas are changing within the ranking or
post-ranking periods.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Ball and Kothari present evidence, in their Tables 4 and 5 and Figure
1, that the betas of winner and loser portfolios change over time in the
direction that would be predicted due to leverage changes. These patterns
are replicated in columns (1) and (2) of our Table 2. In this table,
following De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Ball and Kothari (1989), we have
defined winners and losers to be the 50 stocks with the most extreme
ranking-period returns. We have calculated betas in each year of a 2 -year
pre-ranking period (years -6 to -5), the ranking period (years -4 to 0),
and the post-ranking period (years +1 to +5). The changes in the betas from
the pre-ranking period to the ranking period, and from the ranking period
to the post-ranking period, are striking. The ranking period betas appear
to suffer from severe biases. Apparently, the timing of the extreme
returns on winners (and losers) is correlated with the market excess
return. What is particularly noteworthy is that in the pre-ranking period,
the firms that subsequently become the extreme winners and losers have
betas that are practically indistinguishable from each other. 11 From year
10Chan (1988, p. 160) reports post-ranking period betas on winner and
loser portfolios of 1.315 and 1.208, respectively. He uses monthly data to
estimate market model parameters during a 36 month post-ranking period. His
sample involves portfolios formed every 3 years, rather than every year, as
we do
.
11 The betas of both the subsequent winners and losers are above 1.0
during the pre-ranking period. This is a consequence of the fact that small
firms tend to have high betas, and firms with a lot of unique risk are
13
-5 to -4, the beta of the winner portfolio jumps from 1.21 to 1.58, whereas
the beta of the loser portfolio falls from 1.12 to 0.78. These dramatic
shifts are in the opposite direction to the changes predicted by the
leverage hypothesis.
The leverage hypothesis predicts that, since year -4 is part of the
ranking period, the equity beta of winners should fall, and equity beta of
losers should rise. (In the ranking period, the winners have an average
annual raw return of 55 percent for 5 years, while the losers have an
average annual raw return of -9 percent for 5 years.) Throughout the
ranking period, the betas of the winners remain high and the betas of the
losers remain low. As soon as the ranking period ends, there is another
huge change in betas. Between years and +1, the winner's betas decrease
by 0.36, and the loser's betas increase by 0.48, a combined swing of 0.84.
One would expect a much smaller change, given that the market
capitalizations change by a smaller amount between years and +1 than
between any two adjacent years during the ranking period. In contrast, the
swing in betas during the entire 5 year ranking period in which the
relative market capitalizations changed dramatically is only 0.65 (0.27 for
winners, and 0.38 for losers).
These abrupt changes in betas cast doubt on the hypothesis that the
changes are primarily due to movements in leverage. Thus, a fundamental
question is raised about just what phenomenon is being captured by the
betas of the winners and losers. The puzzle deepens when the patterns in
overrepresented among both extreme winners and extreme losers. Large firms
are generally more diversified, and are thus less likely to become extreme
winners or losers.
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betas for up and down markets are observed. 12 During down markets,
defined as years for which rm -r f<0, the betas of winner and loser
portfolios show little variation between the ranking and post-ranking
periods. Furthermore, in the post-ranking period the down-market betas
differ by only 0.27 (0.83 for winners, 1.10 for losers). In contrast,
during up markets, defined as years for which rm-r f>0, the betas of winners
fall by roughly half from the ranking period to the post-ranking period,
while the betas of losers approximately double. Furthermore, during the
post-ranking period, the up-market betas of winners and losers differ by a
full 1.05 (0.75 for winners, 1.80 for losers). Thus, the large difference
in betas between winners and losers in the post- ranking period emphasized
by Ball and Kothari is driven primarily by the extraordinarily high betas
on losers during up markets. Thus, while the difference in betas during
the post-ranking period between portfolios comprised of the 50 most extreme
winners and losers is 0.70 (0.80 using extreme vitile portfolios in Table
1) , we have serious reservations whether the difference in risk that
investors face is actually of this magnitude.
What is beta capturing? This is an open issue that requires further
study. Work by Bhandari (1988), Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1990), and Kan
(1991) finds only a weak association between changes in leverage and equity
betas
.
D
. Size-adjusted excess returns
The discussion so far has focused on how to adjust for differences in
12 De Bondt and Thaler (1987) first documented these differences in betas
between up and down markets.
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betas between winners and losers. However, winners and losers differ on
another dimension as well. Prior research, (e.g., Zarowin (1990)) has
found that on average losers have lower market capitalizations than
winners, indicating that measurement of excess returns must be careful to
control for size effects. The correlation of size and prior returns is
apparent from inspection of Figure 2, in which we have plotted the
percentage of each size quintile that falls into each prior return
quintile. (We plot quintile results, rather than the vitile portfolios
that we use in the empirical work, to minimize the clutter that would
otherwise obscure the figure.) For example, inspection of Figure 2 shows
that in the smallest size quintile, 40 percent of the firms are in the
extreme loser quintile, while only 10 percent are in the extreme winner
quintile. As a consequence of this correlation of size and prior returns,
a simple size adjustment may cause one to underestimate the extent of any
overreaction effect.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In column (1) of Table 3, we report the average annual returns on
vitile portfolios (these numbers are the same as in column (1) of Table 1)
.
In column (2), we report the returns on control portfolios formed by
matching on size (we refer to these as size-control portfolios). To
construct the size-control portfolios, at the end of each of the 52
portfolio formation periods, we take the population of firms and rank them
on the basis of their market capitalization, and then assign the firms to
20 portfolios formed on the basis of size. In computing the average annual
returns on these size vitile portfolios, we follow the same procedure as
used in Table 1 with the prior return vitile portfolios. For each prior
-o c^
Fig. 2. The joint distribution of firms categorized by market
capitalization and prior returns.
For each size quintile, the percentage of firms falling in each prior
return quintile is plotted. Quintile portfolios are plotted rather than
the vitile portfolios utilized in the empirical work because 400
portfolios (20x20) produces too cluttered a figure compared with the 25
portfolios plotted. Prior return quintile 1-losers, 5-winners. Size
quintile 1-small, 5-large.
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return vitile, we form a size-control portfolio. This size-control
portfolio is constructed to have the same size composition as its
corresponding prior return vitile portfolio, with the weights being
determined by the proportion of the prior return vitile that fell in each
size classification.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In column (3) of Table 3, we report the average annual returns on
size-control portfolios formed in a manner identical to that employed in
column (2) , with the exception that the population of firms from which the
size portfolios are drawn has been purged of firms in prior return vitiles
1-5 (losers) and 16-20 (winners). 13 The purpose of this purging is to
minimize the confounding of any overreaction effects with size effects.
(It should be noted that purging the most extreme 25 percent of winners and
the most extreme 25 percent of losers is arbitrary.)
In column (5) of Table 3, we report excess returns computed by
subtracting the unpurged size-control returns. There is a nearly monotonic
decrease in the excess returns as one goes from portfolio 1 (the losers) to
portfolio 20 (the winners). The difference in excess returns between the
extreme portfolios is 6.6 percent per year during the 5 post-ranking years.
In column (6), we report the excess returns computed using the purged
size-control portfolios. The pattern in column (5) is accentuated,
confirming our conjecture that controlling for size without taking the
correlation of size and prior returns into account understates the
overreaction effect. The difference between the extreme portfolio excess
1 Because of the correlation of size and prior returns, more than 50
percent of the smallest firms (and largest) are purged, and slightly less
than 50 percent of moderate-size firms are purged.
Table 3
Average annual post-ranking period percentage returns for 20 portfolios of
firms ranked by their five-year ranking period returns, size-control portfolios
with and without losers and winners purged, and the associated excess returns.
The 20 size-control portfolios are constructed to have approximately the same
market values as the 20 ranked portfolios. Excess returns are computed two
different ways: (i) size-adjusted returns using all firms (unpurged) , and (ii)
,
size-adjusted returns after the firms have been purged of all firms in the top
5 and the bottom 5 vitiles of prior returns (purged)
.
Average annual return in years +1 to +5 Excess
e =
returns
Ranked
firms
Control firms
Difference
r - r
Unpurged Purged Unpurged Purged
Portfolio (r
p ) (r.) (r.) (2)-(3) (D-(2) (D-(3)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 27.3 23.4 20.4 3.0 3.9 6.9
2 23.0 21.3 19.3 2.0 1.7 3.7
3 21.0 20.6 19.0 1.6 0.4 2.0
4 21.2 20.0 18.8 1.2 1.2 2.4
5 20.5 19.4 18.0 1.4 1.1 2.5
6 19.9 18.8 18.0 0.8 1.1 1.9
7 19.4 18.9 18.1 0.8 0.5 1.3
8 18.5 18.1 17.6 0.5 0.4 0.9
9 17.6 17.9 17.4 0.5 -0.3 0.2
10 17.8 17.5 17.2 0.3 0.3 0.6
11 16.9 17.3 16.9 0.4 -0.4 0.0
12 16.6 17.0 16.7 0.3 -0.4 -0.1
13 16.7 16.9 16.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
14 16.1 16.6 16.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.2
15 15.5 16.6 16.4 0.2 -1.1 -0.9
16 15.3 16.6 16.4 0.2 -1.3 -1.1
17 14.6 16.2 16.1 0.1 -1.6 -1.5
18 14.5 16.0 16.1 -0.1 -1.5 -1.6
19 14.3 16.0 15.9 0.1 -1.7 -1.6
20 13.3 16.0 16.1 -0.1 -2.7 -2.8
Mean 18.0 18.0 17.4 0.6 0.0 0.6
r l" r20 14.0 7.4 4.3 3.1 6.6 9.7
c^
Fig. 3. The joint distribution of average annual returns in the post-
ranking period categorized by market capitalization and prior returns
The average annual return on the smallest quintile of losers is 27.37
percent, while the average annual return on the largest quintile of
winners is 11.59 percent. Prior return quintile l=losers, 5=winners
.
Size quintile 1-small, 5=large
.
17
returns is 9.7 percent per year during the 5 post-ranking years. From
these numbers, it appears that there is an economically significant
overreaction effect above and beyond any size effect.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 3, we plot the joint distribution of annual raw percentage
returns for the same quintile portfolios used in Figure 2. Inspection of
this figure shows that, holding size constant, returns are higher the lower
are prior returns, and holding prior returns constant, returns are higher
the smaller is size. On average, holding size constant, the extreme loser
quintile has a 5.4 percent higher average annual return than the extreme
winner quintile. On average, holding prior returns constant, the smallest
size quintile has an 8.2 percent higher average annual return than the
largest size quintile. However, before concluding that there is an
economically significant overreaction effect, an adjustment for beta risk
must also be made.
3 . Multivariate tests
The previous section demonstrated that after controlling for size
effects, an economically significant overreaction effect persisted. Our
size-control analysis did not incorporate the effect of beta on returns,
however. In this section, we present multiple regression evidence that
simultaneously incorporates the effects of beta, size, and prior returns on
post-ranking period returns. This analysis uses 400 portfolios, each
containing an unequal number of firms, formed on the basis of independent
vitile rankings of firm size and prior returns. For each of these
portfolios, a beta is calculated from a pooled (across both post-ranking
18
years and firms) regression, using r it -r ft as the dependent variable and
rmt -rft as the explanatory variable, where r it is the return on firm i in
year t. The raw portfolio return is also calculated as the pooled (across
both firms and post-ranking years) average return. 14
In the appendix we report results using two alternative procedures
for calculating betas and returns for each of the 400 portfolios. In
general, the results are qualitatively similar.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In Panels A-D of Table 4, we report the results of estimating
equation (2) using these 400 portfolios:
r
p
-r f - a + a^IZEp + a2RETURNp + a 3betap + e p (2)
The explanatory variables in Panels A-D are relative market capitalization
(SIZE), measured as the portfolio vitile rank (1 small, 20 large), prior
five-year returns (RETURN) , measured as the portfolio vitile rank (1
losers, 20 winners), and the portfolio beta. 15 In Panel A, using annual
returns, we find that all three explanatory variables are highly
uWhen annual returns are used, if a given portfolio, e.g., the smallest
extreme losers (size vitile 1, return vitile 1) has a total of 83 firms in it
over the entire 52 formation periods (an average of 1.6 firms per formation
period), there are up to 83x5 annual returns (if each of the 83 firms lasted
for all five post-ranking years)
.
15 We have explored some alternatives to our use of vitile rankings as
measures of prior returns and size. For example, using the actual prior
return rather than the vitile rank produces a slightly better fit and a
stronger measured overreaction effect. One reason for our preference for
the use of vitile rankings to measure size is that market capitalizations
changed substantially over time during our 52 year sample period. This poses
a problem for pooling observations over time. For a detailed discussion of
some of the issues involved, see Chan, Hamao , and Lakonishok (1991). We have
not attempted to conduct a comprehensive examination of alternative
specificiations , for this would then introduce data-snooping biases. To the
degree that we have made only a limited attempt to examine alternative
specifications, the magnitude of our reported overreaction effect may be
conservative
.
Table 4
OLS regressions of portfolio average annual excess returns
for the first five post-ranking years for portfolios of NYSE
firms formed on the basis of size and prior returns.
For each of the 52 ranking periods ending on December 31 of 1930 to
1981, firms are independently ranked on the basis of their December 31
market value and their five-year prior return, and assigned to one of
400 portfolios based upon these vitiles. Each portfolio beta is the
pooled (over firms and post-ranking years) beta for the firms in the
cell, calculated using the annual returns and equally-weighted market
returns. SIZE is measured as the vitile ranking (1 to 20, with 1 being
smallest), and RETURN is measured as the vitile ranking (1 to 20, with 1
being the most extreme prior losers). In Panels E-H, DS is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a portfolio is among the bottom 40 percent of
SIZE vitiles, DM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a portfolio is among
SIZE vitiles 9 to 16 (the middle 40 percent) , and DL is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a portfolio is among the largest 20 percent of SIZE
vitiles. T-statistics are in parentheses.
rp -r f
- a + a^IZEp + a2RETURNp + a 3Betap + e p
coefficient estimates
intercep t SIZE RETURN Beta R2adiusted
Panel A: Annual percentage returns
14.443 -0.364 -0.254 5.438 0.68
(10.812) (-10.491) (-10.508) (6.123)
Panel B: Monthly percentage returns, all months
1.236 -0.031 -0.023 0.369 0.68
(9.138) (-10.298) (-11.388) (3.948)
Panel C: Monthly percentage returns, Januaries only
3.271 -0.212 -0.104 4.329 0.90
(8.251) (-20.862) (-12.275) (17.309)
Panel D: Monthly percentage returns, Feb. -Dec. only
0.958 -0.012 -0.012 0.034 0.22
(7.656) (-4.478) (-6.506) (0.378)
r
p
-r £ - a + a^IZEp + a 2DS»RETURNp + a 3DM«RETURN p + a 4 DL»RETURN p + a 5Beta + e
coefflcienc estimates
;ptec<;ept; SIZE DS'RETURN DH»RETURN DL«RETURN
Panel E: Annual percentage returns
18.113 -0.597 0.417 -0.182 -0.136 A. 364
(13.559) (-13.093) (-13.428) (-7.176) (-3.783) (5.176)
Panel F: Monthly percentage returns, nil months
1.631 -0.055
-0.039 -0.018 -0.010 0.238
(12.576) (-14.557) (-15.589) (-8.708) (-3.658) (2.759)
0.72
0.73
Panel C: Monthly percentage returns, Januaries only
4.817
-0.311 -0.167 -0.095 -0.034 3.904 0.92
(12.252) (-22.641) (-16.203) (-11.559) (-3.087) (16.931)
Panel H: Monthly percentage returns, Feb. -Dec. only
1-199
-0.026 -0.022 -0.007 -0.006
-0.051 0.29
(9.508) (-7.226) (-9.062) (-3.664) (-2 132) (-0.590)
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significant and the coefficients have the predicted signs. Furthermore, a
large fraction of the variation in portfolio returns is explained (the R2
is 0.68). The RETURN coefficient of -0.254 implies that after controlling
for size and beta, extreme losers outperform extreme winners by 4.8 percent
per year on average for the 5 post-ranking years. [Since RETURN (and SIZE)
is measured as the vitile rank, -0.254 multiplied by 1-20 results in the
4.8 percent difference.] Also noteworthy is that in Panel A, the
coefficent on beta of 5.438 percent is lower than the 9.402 percent slope
reported in Figure 1. Apparently, estimates of the SML slope from single
variable regressions suffer from an omitted variable bias. Another aspect
worth noting is that the magnitude of the overreaction effect is nearly as
great as that of the size effect, as can be seen by comparing the two
coefficients
.
To examine how sensitive these conclusions are to the use of annual
returns rather than the monthly returns that are more commonly used in
empirical studies, and to examine seasonal effects, in Panels B-D results
from monthly regressions are reported. (In Panels B-D, we use monthly
returns to calculate betas.) Panel B reports results that, after
multiplying the monthly coefficients by 12, are qualitatively similiar to
those in Panel A. The overreaction effect is slightly stronger, with Panel
B reporting that extreme losers outperform extreme winners by 5.2 percent
per year, ceteris paribus. The compensation per unit of beta is 4.4 percent
per year using monthly data, a decrease from the 5.4 percent per year
reported in Panel A using annual returns.
In Panels C and D, we examine whether the overreaction effect is
present in both January and non- January months. This is motivated by De
20
Bondt and Thaler's (1985) Figure 3 diagram, as well as the work of Fama and
French (1986) and Zarowin (1990), where a pronounced January seasonal is
apparent. In these panels, separate betas are calculated for the January
and non-January months for each of the 400 portfolios. Inspection of
Panels C and D shows that SIZE, RETURN, and beta have much stronger effects
in January than in the non- January months, consistent with previous
findings. What is most noteworthy, however, is that the majority of the
annual overreaction effect occurs outside of January. This can be seen by
multiplying the non- January coefficient on RETURN of -0.012 by 11, and
comparing it with the January RETURN coefficent of -0.104. This analysis
indicates that 56 percent [ . 132/( . 104+. 132) ] of the annual overreaction
effect occurs in non- January months. 15
In Panels E-H, we permit the overreaction effect to vary by firm size
by estimating three different slope coefficients, depending upon whether a
portfolio is comprised of small, middle-size, or large firms. Panel E
reveals that the overreaction effect is strongest among smaller firms. The
DS«RETURN coefficent of -0.417 implies a 7.9 percent per year abnormal
return difference between vitiles 1 and 20 for the bottom 40 percent of
market capitalization firms. For middle-size firms, this difference is 3.5
percent, while for the larger (upper 20 percent) firms, the difference is
2.6 percent. This dependency of the extent of overreaction on firm size
has not previously been noted.
The results in Panels F-H are consistent with the conclusions from
the other panels. For all size groups, the overreaction effect is stronger
16 In these results, we have computed separate betas for January and non-
January months. When we restrict the betas to be the same in all 12 calendar
months, almost all of the overreaction effect is concentrated in January.
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in January than in the non-January months. To examine the robustness of
our Table 4 results, we have also run the regressions for subperiods (1931-
56 and 1957-82). These results (not reported here) indicate that there is
a significant overreaction effect in both subperiods, although the effects
are stronger in the second subperiod. This is in contrast to the evidence
on index autocorrelations over 3-5 year periods reported by Fama and French
(1988), where they find weaker results for subperiods excluding the 1930s.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The evidence in Panels E-H of Table 4 demonstrates that the
overreaction effect is stronger for smaller firms. This finding deserves
further analysis. In Table 5, we examine the extent of overreaction within
each of ten size deciles by reporting regression results with RETURN and
beta as explanatory variables. Each of the 10 regressions utilizes the 40
portfolios out of the 400 formed for our Table 4 analysis that correspond
to the appropriate size grouping. In Table 5, the coefficent on RETURN is
generally closer to zero the larger is the size decile. The last column in
the table reports the implied annual difference in returns between the
extreme winner and loser vitiles, holding size and beta constant. These
differences in returns are plotted in Figure 4. The numbers demonstrate
that for the smaller firms, an overreaction effect on the order of 10
percent per year (50 percent per 5 years!) is present, while for the
largest 20 percent of NYSE firms (roughly the S&P 500) , no overreaction
effect is apparent. Since individuals are the primary holders of the
smaller firms, while institutions are the dominant holders of the larger
firms, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals
overreact, while institutional investors do not. Others, such as Shiller
Table 5
OLS regressions of portfolio annual average percentage excess
returns on ranking-period return vitiles and beta by size
decile.
RETURN is measured 1 to 20 (1 - losers, 20 - winners), where prior returns
are measured over the 5 years prior to the portfolio formation date.
Firms are assigned to size deciles on the basis of their market
capitalization at the end of the ranking period. The beta of each
portfolio is calculated as the pooled (over firms and post-ranking years)
beta. Each of the 10 regressions uses 40 observations (2 vitiles of size
with 20 prior return vitile portfolios in each size vitile) . T-statistics
are in parentheses.
r
p
-r f =- a + a-LRETURNp + a 2Betap + ep
coefficient estimates -19xRETURN
Size decile intercept RETURN beta R2 adjusted coefficient
1 (small) 9.888 -0.578 9.980 0.76 10.98%
(3.223) (-7.209) (5.026)
2 27.658 -0.729 -2.784 0.74 13.85%
(5.990) (-9.874) (-0.787)
3 21.218 -0.510 0.402 0.65 9.69%
(6.265) (-7.217) (0.154)
4 18.942 -0.350 0.739 0.51 6.65%
(6.271) (-5.303) (0.314)
5 16.356 -0.140 -0.641 0.10 2.66%
(4.790) (-2.147) (-0.219)
6 14.226 -0.293 2.489 0.52 5.57%
(5.299) (-4.666) (1.159)
7 9.149 -0.153 4.838 0.51 2.91%
(4.638) (-3.129) (2.981)
8 8.018 -0.113 5.171 0.37 2.15%
(3.903) (-2.435) (2.634)
9 6.101 -0.016 4.524 0.01 0.30%
(2.175) (-0.279) (1.385)
10 (large) 5.080 0.040 2.471 0.01 -0.76%
(2.749) (1.333) (0.899)
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Fig. 4. The difference in annual abnormal returns between extreme loser
and winner portfolios by size decile.
The numbers plotted are the coefficients on RETURN in Table 5 multiplied
by -19. This represents the expected difference in annual returns for
the 5 post-ranking years between prior return vitiles 1 and 20,
controlling for beta, for firms categorized by their size decile.
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(1984), have made conjectures along these lines.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Our finding that overreaction is concentrated among smaller firms is
consistent with results reported in Fama and French (1988) , where small-
firm portfolios are found to have greater negative serial correlation than
large- firm portfolios. Furthermore, Poterba and Summers (1988) provide
evidence that there is more overreaction in countries with less -developed
capital markets than in countries such as the U.S. or Britian. Together,
this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the further one moves
away from large capitalization stocks in well-developed capital markets,
the more likely it is that stocks take prolonged swings away from their
fundamental value
.
Another noteworthy aspect of the Table 5 regressions is that, in
contrast to the importance of the RETURN variable, which is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level for all but the largest two size
deciles, the coefficient on beta is highly variable and statistically
significant in only three of the ten regressions. For the largest two size
deciles, which account for the majority of market capitalization, beta is
not statistically significant. For these two deciles, the compensation per
unit of beta risk is substantially below the 5.4 percent reported in Panel
A of Table 4, and the 9.4 percent reported in Figure la.
4. Evidence from earnings announcement dates
The evidence presented so far indicates that even after controlling
for size and beta effects, there is an overreaction effect. However,
because the magnitude of any effect measured over long intervals is
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sensitive to the benchmark employed, we also present evidence of
overreaction around earnings announcements. Focusing on short windows such
as the three -day period surrounding earnings announcements minimizes the
sensitivity of results to misspecification of controls. This can provide
further evidence on the existence of an overreaction effect. However, it
cannot shed much light on the exact magnitude because there is no reason
why the return towards fundamental value should occur on only a few
discrete dates.
For the firms in the ranking periods ending in 1970-81, we searched
the Compustat quarterly industrial, historical, and research files for
their quarterly earnings announcements in the first 5 years of the post-
ranking periods. 17 This resulted in 227,522 earnings announcements. For
each of the vitile portfolios formed by ranking firms on prior returns, we
computed the average raw return for earnings announcements for a three -day
window of [-2,0] relative to the Compustat-listed announcement date. This
3
-day window is commonly used in the earnings announcement literature
(e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1991)).
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
In Figure 5, we have plotted the raw 3 -day earnings announcement
period returns using the same size and prior-return quintiles as in Figures
2 and 3. The small losers have average returns of 0.958 percent per 3
17 The quarterly industrial file contains only companies that are
currently publicly- traded. The research file contains companies that were
delisted. Combining these data files gives us a sample that covers almost
all of the NYSE firms in our sample, but only for the most recent 48
quarters. Combining the historical data extends the sample back into the
1970s. Compustat 's data on quarterly earnings announcement dates becomes
progressively less comprehensive for earlier years, which is why we restrict
our analysis to the 1970s and 1980s, rather than use 52 years of data.
Fig. 5. The joint distribution of 3-day earnings announcement returns
categorized by market capitalization and prior returns.
Firms are assigned to portfolios based upon independent rankings of size
and prior returns. The average 3-day raw return at subsequent earnings
announcements is computed for Compustat- listed quarterly earnings
announcement dates during the 5-year post-ranking period. The average 3-
day raw return is 0.001 percent for the largest extreme winners, and 0.958
percent for the smallest extreme losers.
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days, while the large winners have average returns of 0.001 percent per 3
days
.
Returning to the vitile portfolios, the average earnings announcement
period return for firms in vitile 1 (losers) is 0.63 percent. For firms in
prior return vitile 20, the average earnings announcement period return is
zero. Thus, the evidence from earnings announcements indicates that the
market is systematically surprised at subsequent earnings announcements in
a manner consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.
Recent research, however, finds anomalous returns at earnings
announcement dates. 18 In particular, as documented by Chari, Jagannathan,
and Ofer (1988) , small firms tend to have higher earnings announcement
period returns than large firms, and in our case, a disproportionate
fraction of losers are small. Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer hypothesize
that because of the increased flow of information around earnings
announcements, these periods are riskier than non- announcement periods.
Therefore, to examine whether past price changes impact returns around
earnings announcements, we have to control for both size and risk. This is
accomplished by using an approach similiar to that employed in equation
(2). The analysis utilizes 400 portfolios formed on the basis of
independent rankings of firm size and prior returns. For each of these 400
portfolios, we compute an average raw 3 -day holding period return. We also
calculate a portfolio beta by running a pooled market model regression
(over both firms and earnings announcements) using 3 -day announcement
period returns and 3-day market returns.
18 Much of the literature on earnings announcements is surveyed in Ball
and Kothari (1991) .
Table 6
Regression of three -day earnings announcement portfolio
returns on size, prior returns, and beta.
394 portfolios are used (400 portfolios based on independently ranking
firms by size vitiles and by prior return vitiles, with 6 portfolios
deleted that had fewer than 100 earnings announcements) . Size is measured
with the smallest firms in portfolio 1, and the largest in portfolio 20.
Prior returns (measured over the five prior years) are also ranked from 1
to 20, with 1 being the losers. Betas are calculated for each portfolio
using all earnings announcement returns for all firms in the portfolio.
The dependent variable is measured as the percentage return per 3 -day
announcement period [-2,0], for earnings announcements made during the
first five post-ranking years. Earnings announcement days are from
Compustat's industrial, historical, and research tapes, for announcements
during the 5 post- ranking years following the ranking periods ending in
1970-81. There are 227,522 earnings announcements. T-statistics are in
parentheses
.
Rp - a + a^IZEp + a2RETURNp + a 3Betap + e±
coefficient estimates
intercept SIZE RETURN Beta
^adjusted
0.641 -0.027 -0.014 0.111 0.32
(7.506) (-11.389) (-5.752) (1.674)
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
In Table 6 we report the results of a regression based on 400
observations where the portfolio 3 -day return is the dependent variable.
Explanatory variables are SIZE (as measured by the size vitile portfolio
number) , RETURNS (as measured by the prior returns vitile portfolio
number), and beta. The coefficients indicate that, holding beta and firm
size constant, the earnings announcement returns are more positive for
prior losers than winners. In particular, -0.0142 times (1-20) is 0.27
percent per announcement. Since there are four quarterly earnings
announcements per year, this is a difference of 1.08 percent during each
calendar year for these 12 trading days alone. This reinforces our earlier
results on the existence of an overreaction effect.
5 . Summary and Conclusions
One of the most controversial issues in financial economics in recent
years is the question of whether stocks overreact. De Bondt and Thaler
(1985) present evidence that stocks with poor performance (losers) over the
past 3-5 years outperform prior-period winners over the subsequent 3-5
years. This work has received considerable attention because the authors
(i) find a very large difference in returns between winners and losers
during the post-ranking period, about 8 percent per year during the next 5
years, and (ii) interpret their findings as evidence that there are
systematic valuation errors in the stock market caused by overreaction by
investors
.
Subsequent papers suggest that De Bondt and Thaler's findings are
subject to various methodological problems. In particular, Ball and
Kothari (1989) show that when betas are estimated using annual returns, in
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the context of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM nearly all of the estimated abnormal
returns disappear. In another paper, Zarowin (1990) argues that the
overreaction effect is merely a manifestation of the size effect. It is
apparent from the work in this area that the quantitative magnitude of the
overreaction effect is highly sensitive to the procedures used in computing
abnormal returns. This sensitivity is present in any study in which
abnormal returns are being computed over multiple-year periods.
In this paper, we estimate time-varying betas but do not use the
restrictive assumptions of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM in computing abnormal
returns for winners and losers. The Sharpe-Lintner model assumes that the
compensation per unit of beta risk is about 14-15 percent per year when an
equally-weighted market portfolio is used. Given that the betas of extreme
winners and losers differ by about 0.8 when annual returns are used, an
adjustment for beta risk explains a large portion of the overreaction
effect. In this study we rely on the estimated market compensation per
unit of beta risk, which is substantially smaller than that assumed by the
Sharpe-Lintner model. We find results that are consistent with a
substantial overreaction effect. Using annual return intervals, extreme
losers outperform extreme winners by 6 . 5 percent per year. Using monthly
return intervals, this spread increases to 9 . 5 percent per year.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the overreaction effect is not just a
manifestation of the size effect. We demonstrate that the common procedure
of adjusting for size underestimates the spread in abnormal returns between
winners and losers. This is because part of the size effect is a
manifestation of return reversals. After adjusting for size, but before
adjusting for beta effects, we find that extreme losers outperform extreme
27
winners by $.7 percent per year after purging size-control portfolios of
winners and losers.
In general, because size, prior returns, and betas are correlated,
any study that relates realized returns to just one or two of these
variables suffers from an omitted variable bias. In the context of a
multiple regression using all three of these variables, we find an
economically significant overreaction effect of 4.8 percent per year using
annual data and 5.2 percent using monthly data. Although
disproportionately in January, a substantial fraction of the overreaction
effect is present in the non- January months as well.
The overreaction effect, however, is not homogeneous across size
groups. Instead, it is much stronger for smaller companies than for larger
companies, with extreme losers outperforming extreme winners by about 10
percent per year among small firms. These smaller firms are held
predominantly by individuals. In contrast, there is virtually no evidence
of overreaction among the largest 20 percent of market capitalization
firms, where institutional investors are the dominant holders. This
suggests that overreaction by individuals is more prevalent than
overreaction by institutions.
In common with other studies that examine returns over long
intervals, there is always the possibility that what we attribute to
overreaction is instead equilibrium compensation for some omitted risk
factor or factors. However, we feel that our results cannot be entirely
explained by risk mismeasurement since returns consistent with overreaction
are observed for the short windows surrounding quarterly earnings
announcement days. We find that even after adjusting for the size effect
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and the higher risk that is present at earnings announcements, losers have
significantly higher returns than winners.
In summary, we have documented an economically important overreaction
effect in the stock market, concentrated among smaller firms. While the
underlying reasons for the valuation errors have not been uncovered, the
fact that the effect is strongest for smaller stocks may indicate that a
productive area for future research is understanding the difference in the
patterns of investing by individuals and institutions.
Appendix Table 1
OLS regressions of portfolio average annual percentage excess
returns for the first five post-ranking years for portfolios
of NYSE firms formed on the basis of size and prior returns.
For each of the 52 ranking periods ending on December 31 of 1930 to
1981, firms are independently ranked on the basis of their December 31
market value and their five-year prior return, and assigned to one of 400
portfolios based upon these vitiles. SIZE is measured as the vitile
ranking (1 to 20, with 1 being smallest), and RETURN is measured as the
vitile ranking (1 to 20, with 1 being the most extreme prior losers).
T-statistics are in parentheses. Annual returns and an equally-weighted
market index are used in all three panels.
This table reports regression results that are similiar to Panel A
of Table 4 in the text, except that the betas and returns for each of the
400 portfolios are calculated using alternative procedures. Panel A
reports results using betas that are calculated by pooling observations
across both firms and post-ranking event years. This is identical to
Panel A in Table 4 of the text. Panels B and C report results using the
two alternative procedures.
In Panel B, the procedure is analogous to that used in Table 1: for
each of the 400 portfolios we run a time-series regression using (up to)
52 portfolio returns in each of the 5 post-ranking years, and then compute
the portfolio beta as the average of these 5 numbers. A disadvantage of
this procedure is that there are many portfolios that have missing
observations in some of the 52 years.
In Panel C, the procedure used calculates separate betas for each of
the 5 post-ranking years and then averages these 5 numbers to calculate
the portfolio beta.
rp -r f
- a + a
x
SIZE
p
+ a2RETURNp + a 3Betap + ep
coefficient estimates
intercept SIZE RETURN Beta R2adiusted
Panel A: Betas computed with pooling over both firms and event years
14.443 -0.364 -0.254 5.438 0.68
(10.812) (-10.491) (-10.508) (6.123)
Panel A: Betas computed using the RATS procedure
15.637 -0.290 -0.204 7.210 0.70
(13.350) (-9.762) (-8.569) (9.461)
Panel C: Betas computed with pooling over firms
17.838 -0.314 -0.266 5.817 0.67
(13.410) (-9.175) (-11.166) (6.564)
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